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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Matthew Charles Askew appeals from the district court's order 
relinquishing jurisdiction following a period of probation. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
In 2006, Askew pied guilty to grand theft by possession of stolen property 
and was given a suspended seven-year sentence with two years fixed, and 
placed on probation for seven years. (R., pp.61-64, 67-70.) Over three years 
later, the state filed a motion for a probation violation, alleging Askew violated his 
probation by (1) driving under the influence, (2) consuming/possessing alcohol, 
(3) frequenting an establishment where alcohol is the main source of revenue, 
and (4) consuming/possessing alcohol (on a different date than alleged in the 
second allegation). (R., pp.92-94.) Askew admitted allegations two, three, and 
four, but before his disposition hearing, he was arrested for possessing HGH 
(human growth hormone). (R., pp.99-100, 107-108.) 
The state filed a second motion for a probation violation based on the 
HGH that was seized from Askew's residence during a probation search. (R., 
pp.122-124.) However, that allegation was dismissed on the state's motion at 
the outset of the dispositional hearing on Askew's first set of probation violations. 
(R., pp.127-131.) On August 26, 2010, the district court reinstated Askew's 
probation and ordered him to follow any treatment recommendations made by his 
probation officer. (Id.) 
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On November 22, 2010, Askew was arrested on an agent's warrant and 
subsequently alleged to have violated his probation by (1) committing the crime 
of delivering a controlled substance, (2) committing a second crime of delivering 
a controlled substance, and (3) committing the crime of manufacturing a 
controlled substance. (R., pp.132-138, 143-145.) Askew admitted the first and 
second allegations, and the third allegation was dismissed at the state's request. 
(R., pp.158-159.) The district court revoked Askew's probation, imposed his 
original sentence, and retained jurisdiction for one year. (R., pp.162-166.) The 
court also ordered Askew to successfully complete the one-year Therapeutic 
Program, and informed him that if he failed to do so, he would be sent to prison. 
(R., p.163.) 
On December 20, 2011, after receiving a recommendation by the North 
Idaho Correctional Institution that the court relinquish jurisdiction (Addendum to 
the PSI ("APSI")), the district court signed an order relinquishing jurisdiction over 
Askew and remanding him to the custody of the Idaho State Board of Corrections 
for execution of judgment. (R., pp.167-168.) Askew filed a pro se Rule 35 
motion for reduction or correction of his sentence (R., pp.169-173), and the state 
filed an objection to that motion (R., pp.191-193). The district court appointed 
counsel to represent Askew in his Rule 35 proceeding (R., p.187), and counsel 
filed another Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence with a supporting brief (R., 
pp.194-199). On February 29, 2012, the district court entered an order denying 




Askew states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Askew due process 
and equal protection when it denied his motion to augment 
the appellate record with the requested transcripts? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished 
jurisdiction? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. 
Askew's Rule 35 motion requesting leniency in light of the 
mitigating factors present in this matter? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Askew failed to establish the Idaho Supreme Court violated his due 
process and equal protection rights by denying his motion to augment the 
appellate record with irrelevant transcripts? 
2. Has Askew failed to establish the district court abused its discretion in 
relinquishing jurisdiction? 
3. Has Askew failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by 




Askew Has Failed To Establish The Idaho Supreme Court Violated His Due 
Process And Equal Protection Rights By Denying His Motion To Augment The 
Appellate Record With Irrelevant Transcripts 
A. Introduction 
After the appellate record was settled, Askew filed a motion to augment 
with four as-yet unprepared transcripts consisting of two probation violation 
admit/deny hearings, and two probation violation dispositional hearings. (Motion 
To Augment And To Suspend The Briefing Schedule And Statement In Support 
Thereof, filed July 31, 2012 (hereinafter "Motion").) After the state filed an 
objection to the Motion (8/3/12 Objection to "Motion to Augment [etc.]"), the Idaho 
Supreme Court denied Askew's Motion. (Order, filed 8/13/12.) 
Askew now contends that, by denying his motion to augment the appellate 
record with the requested transcripts, the Idaho Supreme Court has violated his 
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection and has effectively 
denied him effective assistance of counsel on appeal. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-
15.) Askew has failed to establish a violation of his constitutional rights, 
however, because he has failed to show that the requested transcripts are even 
relevant to, much less necessary for resolution of, the only issue over which thfs 
Court has jurisdiction on appeal. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one 
of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free 
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review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the 
facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001 ). 
C. Askew Has Failed To Show Any Constitutional Entitlement To The 
Requested Augmentation 
A defendant in a criminal case has a right to "a record on appeal that is 
sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged regarding the 
proceedings below." State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462, 50 P.3d 472, 477 
(2002) (citing Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 
U.S. 477 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. Of Prison Terms and Paroles, 
357 U.S. 214 (1958); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)). The state, however, 
"will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily" to provide transcripts or 
other items that "will not be germane to consideration of the appeal." Draper, 
372 U.S. at 495; see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 112 n.5 (1996) ("an 
indigent defendant is entitled only to those parts of the trial record that are 
germane to consideration of the appeal" (internal citations omitted)); Lane, 372 
U.S. 477; Griffin, 351 U.S. 12. To demonstrate that the record is not sufficient, 
the defendant must show that any omissions from the record prejudiced his 
ability to pursue the appeal. State v. Polson, 92 Idaho 615, 620-21, 448 P.2d 
229, 234-35 (1968) (distinguishing Martinez v. State, 92 Idaho 148, 438 P.2d 893 
(1968)). See also United States v. Smith, 292 F.3d 90, 93 (1st Cir. 2002). To 
show prejudice, Askew "must present something more than gross speculation 
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that the transcripts were requisite to a fair appeal." Scott v. Ela, 302 F.3d 598, 
605 (6th Cir. 2002). Askew has failed to carry this burden. 
Because Askew did not file his Rule 35 motion (filed January 20, 2012) 
within 14 days of entry of the district court's December 20, 2011 Order 
Relinquishing Jurisdiction (see R., pp.67-70; I.C.R. 54.3(a)), his March 2, 2012 
notice of appeal is timely only from the court's February 29, 2012 "Order Denying 
Motion to Reduce Sentence and Order Correcting Credit for Time Served" (R., 
pp.205-207). Inasmuch as Askew's appeal is timely only from the order denying 
his Rule 35 motion, that is the only issue over which the appellate court has 
jurisdiction. See,~. State v. Payan, 128 Idaho 866, 867, 920 P.2d 82, 83 (Ct. 
App. 1996) (a timely filed notice of appeal is a prerequisite to appellate 
jurisdiction); State v. Fuller, 104 Idaho 891, 665 P.2d 190 (Ct. App. 1983) (same). 
Nevertheless, Askew sought to augment the appellate record with (1) a 
transcript of the probation violation admiUdeny hearing held on June 10, 2010, 
(2) a transcript of the probation violation dispositional hearing held on August 26, 
2010, (3) a transcript of the probation violation admiUdeny hearing held on 
January 20, 2011, and (4) a transcript of the probation violation dispositional 
hearing held on March 24, 2011. (Motion, pp.1-2.) Askew argues that the Idaho 
Supreme Court denied him due process and equal protection by denying his 
motion to augment the appellate record with the as-yet unprepared transcripts, 
however, he has failed to adequately explain, much less demonstrate, how 
transcripts of probation violation hearings relate to the only issue on appeal -- his 
Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence. 
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Askew contends "the requested transcripts are relevant to the issues of 
whether the district court abused its discretion in relinquishing jurisdiction and 
denied his I.C.R. 35 motion because the district court could rely on its memory of 
the probation revocation hearings when it decided to relinquish jurisdiction." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.5.) Despite Askew's argument, because the as-yet 
unprepared probation violation transcripts were never presented to the district 
court in relation to the Rule 35 motion at issue in this case, they were never part 
of the record before the district court and are not properly considered for the first 
time on appeal. See State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374, 376 n.1, 859 P.2d 972, 
974 n.1 (Ct. App. 1993) (in rendering a decision on the issues raised on appeal, 
the appellate court is "limited to review of the record made below" and "will not 
consider new evidence that was never before the trial court"); see also Huerta v. 
Huerta, 127 Idaho 77, 80, 896 P .2d 985, 988 (Ct. App. 1995) ("It is not the role of 
this Court to entertain new allegations of fact and consider new evidence."). 
Moreover, because Askew's appeal is untimely from the district court's 
Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction, that order cannot be challenged on appeal. To 
the extent Askew's request for transcripts relates to such a non-cognizable issue, 
it is misplaced. As to the remaining contention that the district court's memory of 
the probation revocation proceedings may have affected its decision to deny 
Askew's Rule 35 motion, Askew does not explain where the record gives any 
indication that the court in fact relied on its memory of specific aspects of those 
proceedings in denying his Rule 35 motion. Before Askew filed his Rule 35 
motion, the court relinquished jurisdiction over him "[b]ased upon the Report from 
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the Department of Corrections[.]" (R., p.167-168.) In that same vein, when the 
court denied Askew's Rule 35 motion, it stressed, as it had promised (see R., 
p.163), Askew's failure to succeed in the retained jurisdiction program, 
explaining: 
Defendant has been given numerous opportunities to 
rehabilitate. Yet he continues to commit serious violations of law. 
In spite of his substantial criminal history the court gave him the 
benefit of a retained jurisdiction. During that program he was 
unable to exhibit a change in his thinking, attitude, or behavior. At 
a time when he should have been on his best behavior, he failed 
the rider. During probation on this case, he committed another 
felony. The court will not reduce the sentence. 
(R., p.206.) Although the district court noted that Askew had committed another 
felony during probation, it gave no hint that it was considering anything specific 
that occurred during the probation violation hearings as supportive of its decision 
to deny the Rule 35 motion. Askew has failed to provide any cogent reason the 
requested transcripts may have been relevant or necessary for reviewing the 
district court's decision denying his Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence 
following the court's order relinquishing jurisdiction and executing sentence. 
Askew further contends, citing State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218 
P.3d 5, 8 (Ct App. 2009), that "the transcripts of the hearings at issue are 
relevant because Idaho appellate courts review all proceedings following 
sentencing when determining whether the court made appropriate sentencing 
determinations."1 (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) The state recognizes the Idaho Court 
of Appeals' statement in Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28, 218 P .3d at 8, that 
1 For purposes of this argument, the state assumes, arguendo, that a Rule 35 
motion for reduction of sentence is a "sentencing determination." 
8 
appellate "review [of] a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period 
of probation" is based "upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed 
as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of 
probation." Contrary to Askew's assertions, however, Hanington does not stand 
for the proposition that a merits-based review of a decision to relinquish 
jurisdiction and order a sentence executed requires preparation and inclusion in 
the appellate record of transcripts of every hearing over which the trial court 
presided. To the contrary, the law is well established that, absent a showing that 
evidence was presented at prior hearings and that the district court relied on 
such evidence in reaching its decision to revoke probation, an appellant is not 
entitled to transcription at public expense of every hearing conducted before the 
date probation was finally revoked.2 Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 194 
(1971) (state is not "required to expend its funds unnecessarily" where "part or all 
of the stenographic transcript . . . will not be germane to consideration of the 
2 In the recently decided (non-final, yet to be released for publication) decision 
by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Morgan, --- P.3d ----, 2012 WL 2782599 
*3 (Idaho App. 2012), relied upon here as instructive, the Court explained: 
Morgan asserts that this Court's decision in State v. 
Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 218 P.3d 5 (Ct. App. 2009), requires a 
review of the entire record of proceedings in the trial court up to and 
including the revocation of probation. Morgan reads Hanington too 
broadly. As stated in Hanington, in reviewing the propriety of a 
probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily confine ourselves to only 
those facts which arise after sentencing to the time of the 
revocation of probation. Id. at 28, 218 P.3d at 8. However, that 
does not mean that all proceedings in the trial court up to and 
including sentencing are germane. The focus of the inquiry is the 
conduct underlying the trial court's decision to revoke probation. 
Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the record before the 
trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues which are 
properly made part of the record on appeal. 
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appeal" (citation and internal quotations omitted)); Draper, 372 U.S. at 496 
("[T]he fact that an appellant with funds may choose to waste his money by 
unnecessarily including in the record all of the transcripts does not mean that the 
State must waste its funds by providing what is unnecessary for adequate 
appellate review."). 
Although there may be some circumstances that require inclusion in the 
appellate record of transcripts of prior probation violation hearings to fully review 
the denial of a Rule 35 motion, Askew has failed to show that any such 
circumstances apply here. There is nothing provided by Askew that would 
indicate that what happened at the prior hearings, held between 11 and 20 
months before the issuance of the decision that is at issue on appeal, was 
considered or played any role in the district court's decision to deny Askew's 
Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence. Accordingly, Askew has failed to 
show such transcripts are necessary to complete an adequate record on this 
appeal. 
Citing Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971 ), Askew claims he is 
only required to make a "colorable argument" that he "needs items to complete a 
record on appeal" before the burden transfers to the state "to prove that the 
requested items are not necessary for the appeal." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) He 
also argues, with no citation whatsoever, that "to meet the constitutional 
mandates of due process and equal protection," the state must provide him (and 
all indigent defendants) "with an appellate record unless the State can that [sic] 
some or all of the requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous." (Appellant's 
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Brief, p.7; see also p.5 ("[T]he only way a court can constitutionally preclude an 
indigent defendant from obtaining that transcript is if the State can prove that the 
transcript is irrelevant to the issues raised on appeal.").) No reading of Mayer 
supports these legal arguments. 
Mayer was convicted on non-felony charges punishable only by a fine and 
he appealed, challenging the sufficiency of evidence and asserting a claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct. lfL. at 190. The appellate court denied his request for 
a trial transcript at government expense on the basis of a local rule providing that 
verbatim transcripts of trial proceedings would be provided at government 
expense only for felonies. lfL. at 191-93. The issue was not whether Mayer was 
entitled to a record of his trial, but whether he was entitled to a verbatim 
transcript of his trial. lfL. at 193. The Court noted it had addressed a similar 
issue in Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), where the Court held that 
the government need not provide transcripts that were not "'germane to 
consideration of the appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds 
unnecessarily in such circumstances."' Mayer, 404 U.S. at 194 (quoting Draper, 
372 U.S. at 495-96). However, "the State must provide a full verbatim record 
where that is necessary to assure the indigent as effective an appeal as would be 
available to the defendant with resources to pay his own way." lfL. at 195. 
"Moreover, where the grounds of appeal, as in this case, make out a colorable 
need for a complete transcript, the burden is on the State to show that only a 
portion of the transcript or an 'alternative' will suffice for an effective appeal on 
those grounds." lfL. 
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Thus, if it is not clear on the existing record, an indigent appellant must 
establish that a record of certain "proceedings" is germane to the appeal. ~ at 
194. Only after the germaneness of the requested record of the proceedings is 
established and a colorable need for a verbatim record is shown by the appellant 
will the burden shift to the state to demonstrate that a partial transcript or some 
record other than a verbatim transcript will be adequate. ~ at 194-95. See also 
Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227-28 (1971) (in deciding whether 
requested record necessary court should consider the "value of the transcript to 
the defendant in connection with the appeal," but standard does not require "a 
showing of need tailored to the facts of the particular case" and the court may 
take notice of the importance of a transcript). 
Here the only proceeding challengeable on appeal is Askew's Rule 35 
motion for reduction of sentence. The record related to the district court's 
decision is already complete because all of the evidence considered by the 
district court for that motion is before the appellate court. It is Askew's appellate 
burden to establish that the requested transcripts are necessary to create an 
adequate appellate record to review the order denying his Rule 35 motion. The 
augmentation he sought, however, was of never before prepared transcripts 
hearings held 11 and 20 months before the district court rendered the decisions 
at issue in this case. Nothing in the record even suggests that the requested 
transcripts (or anything contained therein) were before the district court in relation 
to the Rule 35 motion. Because Askew failed to make a showing of 
germaneness and colorable need for the requested transcripts, there is no 
12 
burden on the state. Because all of the evidence before the district court is in the 
appellate record, that record is adequate for appellate review, and Askew has 
failed to establish a violation of his due process rights. 3 Strand, 137 Idaho at 
463, 50 P.3d at 478. 
Askew has also failed to establish that denial of his request to augment 
the record on appeal with irrelevant transcripts denied him equal protection. 
Askew cites to several cases where criminal defendants were denied appellate 
records because of their indigence. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.7-11 (citing, ~. 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); 
Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963)).) However, there is nothing in the record 
that in any way indicates that the Idaho Supreme Court denied Askew's request 
for transcripts solely because he is indigent. In fact, Askew's motion would have 
properly been denied even if he had the funds to pay for the transcripts. The 
Idaho Appellate Rules require any party seeking augmentation to set forth a 
ground sufficient to justify the augmentation requested. I.A.R. 30. Askew's 
motion to augment failed because he failed to meet this minimal burden, imposed 
upon all parties, of showing that the transcripts were necessary or even helpful in 
addressing appellate issues. The Idaho Supreme Court's order properly denied 
the motion to augment because Askew failed to make a showing that any 
3 As a component of his due process claim, Askew argues that the denial of his 
motion to augment the record with the requested transcripts has deprived him of 
effective assistance of counsel on appeal. (Appellant's Brief, pp.15-17.) 
Because Askew has failed to show that the requested transcripts are necessary, 
or even relevant, for appellate review of the district court's order denying his Rule 
35 motion, there is no possibility that the denial of the motion to augment has 
deprived Askew of effective assistance of counsel on this appeal. 
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appellant - indigent or otherwise - would be entitled to augment the record as 
requested. There is no reason to believe that the motion to augment would have 
been granted had Askew been paying for the requested transcripts; the rule 
applies to all parties, not just the indigent. 
Askew has failed to show that the denial of his motion to augment was in 
any way influenced or decided by his indigence, nor has he demonstrated that 
the requested transcripts are necessary to complete a record adequate to review 
any issue over which this Court has jurisdiction on appeal. To the contrary, the 
record amply demonstrates that Askew's motion to augment with the requested 
transcripts was properly denied because he failed to show that the transcripts 
were necessary for adequate review of the district court's decision deny his Rule 
35 motion. Because Askew has failed to show his due process and equal 
protection rights were implicated, much less violated, by the denial of his motion 
to augment, he has failed to show any basis for relief. 
11. 
This Court Lacks Jurisdiction To Consider The District Court's Order 
Relinquishing Jurisdiction 
Askew argues that "the district court abused its discretion when it 
relinquished its jurisdiction." (Appellant's Brief, p.18.) However, because Askew 
did not file his appeal within 42 days after entry of the district court's Order 
Relinquishing Jurisdiction (R., pp.167-168), and because the filing of his Rule 35 
motion for reduction of sentence did not extend the time to appeal, his appeal is 
untimely from the relinquishment order and this Court lacks jurisdiction to 
consider an appellate challenge to that order. 
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An appeal as a matter of right may be perfected "only by physically filing a 
notice of appeal ... within 42 days from the date evidenced by the filing stamp ... 
on any judgment, order or decree of the district court appealable as a matter of 
right .... " I.AR. 14(a) {emphasis added); see also I.C.R. 54.3. However, if a 
Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence is filed within 14 days after the entry of 
a judgment, the time to appeal "commences to run upon the date of the clerk's 
filing stamp on the order deciding such motion." I.C.R. 54.3(a). The district 
court's Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction was filed on December 20, 2011. (See 
R., pp.67-70.) Therefore, unless Askew extended his appeal time by filing his 
Rule 35 motion by January 3, 2012, he had until January 31, 2012 to file an 
appeal from the relinquishment order. However, Askew's January 31, 2012 
appeal deadline was not extended because he waited until January 20, 2012 to 
file his Rule 35 motion - well beyond the 14 day period required by I.C.R. 
54.3{a). Askew filed his notice of appeal on March 2, 2012 (R., pp.208-210), 
over one month after his January 31, 2012 appeal period expired; therefore, it 
was untimely. 
Inasmuch as Askew's appeal is not timely from the district court's Order 
Relinquishing Jurisdiction, this Court does not have jurisdiction to consider an 
appellate challenge to that order. See Payan, 128 Idaho at 867, 920 P.2d at 83; 
Fuller, 104 Idaho 891, 665 P.2d 190. Therefore, Askew's second issue on 
appeal (see Appellant's Brief, pp.18-19) must be dismissed. 
15 
111. 
Askew Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying 
His Rule 35 Motion For Reduction Of His Sentence 
A. Introduction 
After Askew was placed in the retained jurisdiction program, the district 
court relinquished jurisdiction and ordered his sentence executed because he 
failed to complete the Therapeutic Community program as ordered. (R., pp.167-
168.) Askew filed a Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence, which the district 
court denied. (R., pp.169-173, 194-195, 205-207.) On appeal, Askew contends 
the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.19-22.) A review of the record shows otherwise. 
B. Standard Of Review 
If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of 
sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and the Court reviews the denial 
of the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 
159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). To prevail on appeal, Askew must "show that the 
sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently 
provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion." kL. 
C. Askew Has Failed To Show Any Abuse Of Discretion In Light Of The 
Marginal New Information Provided In His Rule 35 Motion 
Askew asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied 
his Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence. (Appellant's Brief, pp.19-22.) 
Askew has failed to establish an abuse of discretion. 
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A court's decision not to reduce a sentence is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion subject to the well-established standards governing whether a 
sentence is excessive. Hanington, 148 Idaho at 27, 218 P.3d at 7. Those 
standards require an appellant to "establish that, under any reasonable view of 
the facts, the sentence was excessive considering the objectives of criminal 
punishment." State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005). 
Those objectives are: "(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual 
and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment 
or retribution for wrong doing." State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582, P.2d 728, 
730 (1978). The reviewing court "will examine the entire record encompassing 
events before and after the original judgment," i.e., "facts existing when the 
sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original 
sentencing and the revocation of probation." Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28, 218 
P.3d at 8. 
Askew specifically argues that the information provided by his Rule 35 
motion was mitigating because it demonstrated: (a) he has a job opportunity 
available to him after his release, (b) he was in a 12-step (substance abuse) 
program, (c) his fiance was pregnant and needed his emotional and financial 
support, (d) he learned a lot on his rider and gained insight into his criminal 
behavior, (e) he provided the court with a treatment plan and treatment course 
for his issues with anxiety, (f) he had strong support from his family, and (g) he 
suffers from ADD, bi-polar disorder, and suicidal thoughts. (Appellant's Brief, 
p.21.) Askew also contends that he made some progress during his retained 
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jurisdiction period, and was not considered a disciplinary problem. (Appellant's 
Brief, pp.18-19, 20 (Section II mitigating information incorporated into Section 111 
argument).) Askew has failed to satisfy his burden of showing an abuse of 
discretion in light of the information provided by his Rule 35 motion. Review of 
the record shows Askew's Rule 35 motion contained little, if any, actually new 
information, and what information was provided was entirely consistent with the 
evidence already considered and merely reinforced the district court's sentencing 
rationale. 
Askew pied guilty to grand theft by possession of stolen property for 
possession of stolen checks, which crime was described in the presentence 
report ("PSI") as follows: 
According to the appended police reports, on December 26, 2005, 
Boise Police were dispatched to a break in at Lush Salon, 109 
North 1ih, Boise. The front window was shattered and the salon 
ransacked. It initially appeared the suspect stole one bottle of Bud 
Light beer 'from the refrigerator and exited the back door. A witness 
provided information that led police to Matthew Charles Askew. 
Contacted by police, Mr. Askew admitted wearing a black coat the 
night of the burglary. Inside the pocket was a book of checks 
belonging to the Lush Salon. Broken glass was found in the tread 
of the shoes Mr. Askew said he wore that night and around the 
bottom cuff of a pair of pants. 
(PSI, p.2; see R., pp.61-64; Tr., p.1, L.19 - p.2, L.7.) At sentencing, after 
considering both the aggravating circumstances and the mitigating evidence, the 
district court gave Askew the opportunity to succeed on probation. (Tr., p.16, L.1 
- p.23, L.14; R., pp.67-70.) Askew twice failed to abide by the terms of his 
probation (R., pp.99-100, 158-159), yet the court still gave him the opportunity to 
successfully complete a period of retained jurisdiction, emphasizing that he 
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complete the one-year Therapeutic Community program (R., pp.162-166). 
However, Askew failed to complete that program due to his own recalcitrance, as 
explained by the Department of Correction's updated report and recommendation 
to the district court: 
After review of his institutional performance, program participation, 
probation plan, and central file, ML Askew is recommended for 
Relinquish Jurisdiction. This recommendation was based on the 
following information: Mr. Askew was not a significant disciplinary 
problem; however he continually violated the smaller rules of the 
TC and was unwilling or able [sic] to change his thinking, attitude, 
or behavior. Mr. Askew has not adequately demonstrated a desire 
to stop his harmful behavior or thinking. Staff used numerous 
interventions in the TC and in his assigned group to help him 
change his behavior and thinking; to include several staffings with 
and without Mr. Askew present; however, all of these attempts 
failed. Mr. Askew did not complete his assigned programs. He 
also did not submit what appeared to be a reasonable probation 
plan with a confirmed living arrangement, and his efforts in the 
program did not appear to be sincere regarding his willingness to 
change his criminal thinking and behavior. 
(APSI, p.4.) Askew's failure to make an appropriate effort to complete the 
Therapeutic Community program during his retained jurisdiction period was the 
last straw for the district court -- Askew failed at each of the three opportunities 
given him to continue on probation. 
The information provided in the Rule 35 motion, even taken as true, does 
not change the court's analysis. R., pp.169-173, 194-195.) There is 
nothing changed or new about Askew having a job opportunity at the time of his 
Rule 35 motion (vis-a-vis his sentencing hearing), because he had been actively 
employed in one job for about a year-and-a-half at the time of sentencing, and 
his employer was present at that hearing to show his support. (Tr., p.19, L.24 -
p.20, L.3; PSI, pp.7-8.) Askew's supportive family, as well as his bi-polar, 
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anxiety, and ADD issues were also considered during his sentencing hearing and 
do not constitute new information. (Tr., p.17, L.16 - p.23, L.2; PSI, pp.5-6, 9-11.) 
Admittedly, the pregnancy of Askew's fiance and her need for financial and 
emotional support, his recent involvement in a 12-step program, his new 
treatment plan to address anxiety, and the things he learned from his "rider," was 
all new information at the time of his Rule 35 motion. However, none of that 
information would have had any meaningful impact on the court's decision to 
deny the motion because they do not change the balance of community 
protection, deterrence, and rehabilitation from that employed by the court. As the 
court concluded in denying Askew's Rule 35 motion: 
Defendant has been given numerous opportunities to 
rehabilitate. Yet he continues to commit serious violations of law. 
In spite of his substantial criminal history the court gave him the 
benefit of a retained jurisdiction. During that program he was 
unable to exhibit a change in his thinking, attitude, or behavior. At 
a time when he should have been on his best behavior, he failed 
the rider. During probation on this case, he committed another 
felony. The court will not reduce the sentence. . .. 
The sentence imposed will provide an appropriate 
punishment and deterrent to the defendant and to the community. 
(R., p.206.) 
Askew has failed to show any abuse of discretion. The district court had 
already given significant weight to the mitigating evidence at the time of 
sentencing and determined it appropriate to initially place Askew on probation, 
and despite his failure to comply with the terms of his probation on two 
successive grants of probation, the court gave him one last chance to continue 
on probation by placing him in the rider program to complete the Therapeutic 
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Community program. Given Askew's history of failing to succeed when given the 
opportunity of probation, the district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering 
his original sentence of seven years with two years fixed executed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order denying Askew's Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence. 
DATED this 20th day of November, 2012. 
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